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In this paper we will analyze the efficiency and stability of the Indian financial system using several indicators from the Global 
Financial Development database of the World Bank. In addition, we will briefly look at the concentration and composition of the 
banking sector in India. Lastly, the regulation and supervision of the financial sector in India will be discussed using the 2011 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey of the World Bank. Germany is used as benchmark country. We have found that in 
terms of financial institutions and markets India’s development is noticeable. Banking sector in India was more robust than that 
of Germany in case of gaining profit. Indian stock market is also increasing their financial efficiency. Banking sector has been 
supervised and regulated quite well in the last decade. But quality of assets has been deteriorating in India due to increasing 
non performing loans. As a result liquidity risk increased. 
 





India has made remarkable progress toward developing a stable financial system. Since liberalization in the early 1990s, 
the system’s growth and increasing commercial orientation have been accompanied by steady improvements in the legal, 
regulatory, and supervisory framework. The Indian economy and its financial system weathered the global financial crisis 
well—due to strong balance sheets and profitability entering the crisis, a robust regulatory framework, and timely actions 
to counter pressures on liquidity, the supply of credit, and aggregate demand. The prominent role of the state in the 
financial sector—through ownership of large financial institutions, captive government financing, directed credit to priority 
sectors, tight controls over the range of allowable activities, and restrictions on the availability of foreign capital—
contributes to a build-up of fiscal contingent liabilities and creates a risk of capital misallocation that may constrain 
economic growth. Gradually reducing mandatory holdings of government securities by financial institutions, and allowing 
greater access to private (domestic and foreign) sources of capital, would provide greater room for the financial sector to 
intermediate funds toward productive economic activities, thereby improving prospects for sustained growth. The system 
is also becoming more complex—interlinkages across markets and institutions as well as across borders are growing. 
The combination of a sharp credit expansion and a more recent economic slowdown is putting pressure on banks’ asset 
quality, especially for infrastructure and priority sector lending. Group concentrations have reached troubling levels at 
some banks. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: second section explains efficiency of the financial system in India, third 
section is about financial stability. Fourth section analyzes bank concentration and decomposition and fifth section 
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In the section below, we will discuss the efficiency of the financial system in India and compare it with Germany. Both 
financial institution efficiency and financial market efficiency are analyzed. The efficiency measures give an indication of 
the cost of financial intermediation (Cihàk et al., 2012). 
 
2.1 Financial institution efficiency 
 
The following indicators will be looked at in more detail: the net interest margin, the percentage non-interest income in 
total income, the return on equity and the cost to income ratio. 
 
2.1.1 Net interest margin and non-interest income to total income  
 
Figure 1: Net interest margin (NIM) (%) and non-interest income to total income (%) 
 
 
Remark: For Germany, there must have been a redefinition of the NIM or a change in measurement between 1996-1997.  
 
Source: World Bank GFDD 
 
The net interest margin (NIM) captures the interest income of the banks on loans or other assets minus the interest costs 
that the bank paid on its deposits or other funding divided by the total average amount of assets on which it earned 
income in that time period. The net interest margin in India decreased gradually over the last 20 years (down from 3.55% 
at end-2000 to 2.85% at end-2010), but is still much higher than in Germany (on average 1.21% during 2000-2010). This 
implies that the net cost of financial intermediation through banks is higher in India: borrowers pay on average a higher 
interest rate and depositors receive on average a lower interest rate. Remark that there must have been a redefinition or 
a change in measurement of the net interest margin in 1997 for Germany and this explain the drop from 3.38% at end-
1996 to 1.41% at end-1997. According to the Deutsche Bundesbank, the net interest margin for all banks between 1992-
1996 was on average 1.80% and was stable during that period. 
The evolution of non-interest income shows a volatile pattern for Germany and, to a lesser extent, for India. The 
main sources of non-interest income are from fees and commissions, trading activities and brokerage. In India, the share 
of non-interest income in total income was on average 34.57% during 1996-2010, but peaked during 2002-2004 at 
38.79%, after which it declined to an average of 30.84% during 2005-2007. The high level of non-interest income in 2004 
might be explained by the good performance of the stock market that year. In Germany, the share of non-interest income 
in total income is higher compared to India with an average of 43.78% during 1996-2010 and made up even more than 
50% of total income during 2000-2001 and 2003-2007. The share of non-interest income dropped in 2002 (39.62%) due 
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2.1.2 Return on equity and cost to income ratio 
 




Source: World Bank GFDD 
 
The indicators return on equity (RoE) and the cost to income ratio tell us more about the profitability and cost 
effectiveness of the banking sector. 
The RoE, which is the ratio of net income to yearly averaged equity, is higher in India and remained always 
positive during the period 1997-2010. This indicates that Indian banks generated a higher profit on their shareholder’s 
equity. For Indian banks, the RoE was on average 14.83% with its lowest levels in 1999 & 2001 (10.62%) and highest 
levels in 2003-2004 (20.11%) during which the share of non-interest income was also at its highest levels. One can see 
that Indian banks were not affected by the financial crisis at end-2007-2008. German banks’ RoE was on average 3% 
during 1997-2010, with peaks in 1998 (14.28%) and 2007 (14.38%) and falls in 2003 (-10.3%), caused by the slowdown 
of the German economy (real GDP growth was -0.1% in 2003) which resulted in large loan losses (IMF, FSSA Germany, 
2003), and 2008 (-12.67%), due to the global financial turmoil. The other profitability measure, return on assets (RoA) 
(not plotted here), which is the ratio of net income to yearly averaged total assets, showed a similar pattern as the RoE 
for each country and was on average 0.85% in India and 0.12% in Germany for the period 1997-2010. 
The cost to income ratio shows opposite trends for India and Germany: while the ratio is generally declining in 
India (down from 85.12% in 1992 to 45.07% in 2010), it is increasing in Germany (up from 70% in 1992 to 82.62% in 
2010). Since 1994, Indian banks generate much more income for a given amount of costs and are thus more cost 
efficient. Unsurprisingly the cost to income ratio peaked at 95.80% at end-2008 for Germany, since income dropped 
sharply during the financial crisis. Another cost effectiveness measure, overhead costs to total assets (not plotted here), 
was both for India and Germany decreasing during 1992-2010 (down from 2.94% to 1.69% for India and down from 
2.97% to 1.26% for Germany) but remained slightly higher for India, implying lower cost efficiency for Indian banks when 
expressed in terms of total assets. 
 
2.2 Financial market efficiency 
 
2.2.1 Stock market turnover ratio: value traded / capitalization 
 
Figure 3: Stock market turnover ratio: value traded / capitalization 
 
 
Source: World Bank GFDD 
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The stock market turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period. The idea behind this ratio is as follows: the higher this turnover ratio, the more trading activity 
and thus the more liquid the stock market, so consequently the more efficient the market (Cihàk, 2012). For India, the 
stock market turnover ratio increased strongly from a low 16.63% at end-1992 to a peak of as much as 257.57% at end-
2000, illustrating the rapid speed of development of the stock market. After this record-high at end-2000, the turnover on 
the stock market gradually decreased to 91.92% at end-2005 and remained around 100%, except in 2009 when it jumped 
temporarily to 168.83%, which can be explained by portfolio outflows as most financial institutions (banks & non-banks) in 
developed countries were deleveraging (IMF, WEO, 2010) (the S&P BSE 500 dropped from almost 9000 at begin-2008 to 
around 3000 at begin-2009 but recovered quickly to approximately 7000 at begin-2010). For Germany, the stock market 
turnover was at the beginning of the 90s at a much higher level compared to India (92.18% at end-1992), and was less 
volatile during 1992-2010, with a peak of 195.83% at end-2008, caused by panic sales on the stock market (the DAX 
dropped from almost 8000 at begin-2008 to approximately 4700 at end-2008), and falls of 63.12% at end-1993 and 




3.1 Financial institution stability 
 
Financial stability deals with indicators which assesses the financial sector, (the banking system in our case) to see 
whether it is stable or it is evolving to any distress (or a crisis). It is also, “a part of the broader financial development 
process” (ýihák & al, 2012). In the lines to follow, we’ll be analyzing India and Germany Z-score which is the common 
variable used to measure financial stability as point out by ýihák & al (2012), as well as other variables such as bank 
credit to bank deposits, liquid assets to deposits and short term funding, etc, also called indicators of soundness. 
 
3.1.1 Bank Z-score and Bank credit to bank deposits 
 
Figure 4: Bank Z-score and bank credit to deposits 
 
 
Source: World Bank GFDD 
 
The Z-score is a key variable on financial stability that compares buffers (capitalization and returns) with the potential for 
risk (volatility of returns). It is inversely related to the probability of a financial institution‘s insolvency, i.e. the probability 
that the value of its assets becomes lower than the value of its debt (ýihák & al, 2012). As we can see from the graph 
above, from 1997 to 1999, the Z-score in India and Germany were practically the same, but after this period India Z-score 
(in green) experienced an increase from 20,4 in 1999 to 28 in 2010, while that for Germany (in blue) started to fall from 
21,3 to 7,4 in 2008. Meaning that, the banking system of Germany was more exposed to insolvency issues during this 
period, while India’s banking sector stability was moderately strengthening. Indeed, this is in line with a finding of 
Poghosyan & ýihák, (january 2009, P9-10) that stipulates that, most of the 79 distress episodes for 54 EU banks 
occurred in Germany between 1997 to 2008. After the global financial crisis of 2008, Germany Z-score improved by 
increasing up to 13 in 2010. 
Bank credit to deposits is the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a 
share of total deposits. Bank credit to bank deposits in Germany is quite high compared to that for India during the 1990-
2010 period. It increases from 156% to 178%, during 1990-1998 period and decreases from 123 to 89 in 2000-2010 
period; meaning that, during this period, German banks were decreasingly financing the private sector. And, as we saw 
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with the Z-score, this might also be explained by the distress episodes faced by German banks over the 1997-2008 
period. In India, we do observe a decrease of 19.6% of this indicator from 1990 to 2003, followed by an increase from 
60,4% in 2003 to 76,3% in 2010. This is quite in line with the growth in GDP per capita which was on average 6.6% 
during 2003-2010. Indeed, as argued by Honohan & Beck (2007), credit to the private sector is most closely correlated 
with economic growth as this variable measures the degree to which savings are allocated to productive uses which can 
stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, this rise in the India Bank credit to bank deposits is also consistent with the fact 
that, “Credit and deposit growth in the banking sector have decelerated while banks’ reliance on borrowed funds has 
increased” (India’s Central Bank, 2012). 
 
3.1.2 Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding 
 
Figure 5: Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding 
 
 
Source: World Bank GFDD 
 
Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding are the ratio of the value of liquid assets to short-term funding plus total 
deposits. It shows the ability of a bank to repay its liabilities that can be claimed at short notice with its cushion of cash 
and with the assets that can be readily monetized (Angora & Roulet 2011, P10). The higher is the ratio, the more a bank 
is able to repay its short term liabilities with the liquid assets from its balance sheet. Thus we can see from the graph 
above that, this indicators has been decreasing in India during the 1996-2010 period from 20% to less than 10%, Indian 
banks were more and more exposed to distress while there was a fortune reversal in Germany, where this indicator 
decreased slightly from 32% in 1996 to 27% in 2004, following by an increase from that level to 34% in 2009 and a quick 
jump up to 74% in 2010. This sudden rise might be the results of the substantial public intervention and balance sheet 
contraction after the global financial turmoil of 2008. In fact, from October 2008 to December 2010, the German federal 
government established the Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin), a €480 billion rescue package to provide 
guarantees and recapitalization, as well as funds for asset relief measures (IMF, 2011). And as pointed out by the 
authors, “These measures have successfully stabilized the German financial sector”. 
 
3.1.3 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
 
Figure 6: Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
 
 
Source: World Bank GFDD 
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It is a ratio of total regulatory capital to its held assets, weighted according to the risk of those assets. Angora & Roulet 
(2011) showed econometrically that, the bank probability of default is negatively related with the level of bank 
capitalization at risk. Meaning that, the more the T12_RWA, the lower the probability of a bank to default. Thus, as the 
graph above shows, the T12_RWA in India and Germany had almost the same pattern from 2005 to 2008. But certainly 
thanks to exceptional government's measures to rescue its banking system after the 2008 crisis, Germany's bank 
capitalization relative to the risk improved significantly from 13,6% to 16,1% (and became one of the highest in EU) 
during the 2008-2010 period (IMF, 2011). During the same period in India, this indicator slightly increased by 4,6% and 
remains lower than that for Germany. 
 
4. Bank Concentration and Composition 
 
4.1 Bank asset concentration (5 largest) and percentage of foreign banks among total banks 
 




Source: World Bank GFDD 
 
Bank concentration of five largest banks (%) means that assets of five largest commercial bank as a share of total 
commercial bank assets. We see from the above table that bank asset concentration for the five largest banks was above 
46 % in the year 1997 in India. In the year 2001, it was above 43 % and increased above 44 % in the year 2002. Then the 
percentage became decreasing and it was above 39 % in the year 2010. On the other hand bank asset concentration for 
the five largest banks was above 30 % in the year 1997 in Germany, and then the trend reached above 35 % in the year 
1999. The trend was increasing gradually from the year 2000 to the year 2008 but there were some fluctuations in the 
trend. The trend decreased a little bit in the year 2009 and the figure was above 43 %. Finally the trend increased above 
46 % in the year 2010. Bank asset concentration for five largest banks in Germany was above India after 2004. Finally we 
can say that bank concentration for five largest banks was decreasing over time which means that competitiveness in 
banking sector in India is increasing over time. 
On the other hand, Percentage of foreign banks among total banks means percentage of the number of foreign 
owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy. A foreign bank is a bank where 50 percent or more of its 
shares are owned by foreigners. 
From the above table we see that percentage of foreign banks among total banks was increasing gradually in India 
from 1995 to 2009. The value of the trend was 6, 8, 9 and 12 for the year 1995, 2001, 2004 and 2009 respectively. On 
the other hand percentage of foreign banks among total banks in Germany was also increasing over time but there were 
some fluctuations in the trend. It was 10 for the year 1995, 13 for the year 2003 and 14 for the year 2009. Foreign banks 
may cause financial instability. 
"Given the importance of foreign banks in many countries, understanding the motivations of foreign 
banks to enter a particular host country, the mode by which they do so, and the impact they have on 
financial sector development and lending stability has become essential. We find that on average foreign banks reduced 
lending more compared to domestic banks during the global crisis. As such, foreign banks arguably contributed to 
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5. Regulation and Supervision 
 
Bank regulation and supervision cover many aspects; but based on the global data base of the 2011 Bank Regulation 
and Supervision Survey of the World Bank, we will focus on the organization of capital adequacy and the organization of 
deposit insurance in India and Germany. 
 
5.1 Micro-prudential supervision in India and Germany 
 
First of all, it’s important to point out that, micro-prudential supervision of banks in India is assured by the Reserve bank of 
India. This institution was established on April 1935, with the main objective of “regulate the issue of Bank Notes and 
keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit 
system of the country to its advantage”1. 
Thus, the Reserve Bank regulates and supervises India’s financial system and in terms of micro-prudential 
supervision, they control: commercial banks and all other Indian development financial institutions, urban co-operative 
banks, Regional Rural Banks (RRB), District Central Cooperative Banks and State Co-operative Banks and Non-Banking 
Financial Companies (NBFC). In Germany this role is assured by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). 
 
5.2 Organization of capital adequacy (India and Germany) 
 
Since 2007, the regulatory capital adequacy regime used in India and Germany is Basel II. That regime covers: credit 
risks, market risks and operational risks. Requirements and results of assessment of capital adequacy for India and 
Germany are summarized in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Comparison of capital adequacy between India and Germany 
 
Indicators Germany India 
Minimum risk-based regulatory capital ratio required at the end 2008-2010/ 
Risk —based capital ratio 8% 9% 
2008 13,5 9% 0,00% 
200 9 14,82% 14,00% 
2010 16,05% 14,50% 
Minimum required non risk-based regulatory capital ratio (2008-2010) None None 
Application of minimum capital requirement At the Individualbank level 
At every banking 
group or subgroup level 
Min Max Min Max 
Tier 1 capital ratio required/
Tier 1 capital ratio at the end 2008-2010 4% - 6% - 
2008 9,55% 0,00% 
 
200 9 10,84% 9,60% 
2010 11,83% 10,10% 
Legally allowed in regulatory capital Min Max Min Max 
-Common equity 2% - 0% - 
-Tier 2 8% 100% 0% 6% 
-Tier 3 - 250% Not controlled 
Fraction of revaluation gains allowed as part of capital 45% 0% 
 
Source: World Bank Global Data Base of the 2011 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
 
We notice from the table above that, at 9%, the minimum risk-based regulatory capital ratio required in India is higher 
than that of Germany (+1% compare to the one of Germany), and that since 2009 India’ risk based capital ratio fulfills the 
                                                            
1 Reserve bank of India website (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx#top) 
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requirements of Basel II. Moreover, with a risk –based capital ratio of 14% in 2010 (+0.5% compared to 2009), India is 
improving, and the difference of that ratio across the two countries is negligible (lower than 2%). 
Same results are found for tier 1 capital ratio, for which requirement is 6% in India and 4% in Germany; here also 
minimum requirements are different for the two countries and India is improving. In fact, in 2010 India realized a tier 1 
ratio of 10.1% (+0.5% compared to the level of 2009) and here also, the difference between India and Germany is 
negligible (1.73% in 2010 in the favor of Germany). Therefore, it appears that Indian banks are doing quite well in terms 
of capital adequacy. 
However, in 2008, India’s micro-prudential supervision in terms of capital adequacy requirements was lax allowing 
the economy to run a 0% risk –based capital ratio and a 0% tier 1 capital ratio. That situation changed after the global 
financial crisis of 2007, but we think that, more restrictions should be put on the minimum requirements legally allowed 
for: common equity, tier 2, and tier 3 ratios in India which are still 0%. In Germany, minimum requirement for common 
equity and tier 2 ratio are respectively 2% and 8%. Moreover India does not control Fraction of revaluation gains as part 
of capital, while Germany does. Additional efforts should be done on that sense in India, concerning capital adequacy. 
In addition a striking point on the comparison of the organization of capital adequacy supervision between India 
and Germany is that minimum capital requirement in India are applied at banking group or sub-group level, while in 
Germany they are applied at the individual bank level. Grouping the assessment of minimal capital requirement for 
banking group or subgroup, can hide information on individual banks that are not performing well. Knowing how banks 
insolvency or inefficiency can spread to one another, we think that, India should also adopt individual bank supervision for 
minimum capital requirement. 
 
5.3 Organization of the deposit insurance system 
 
Globally, a deposit insurance fund is an insurance fund that guarantees deposits at banks or other savings institutions up 
to a certain amount2. In this section, we discuss how the deposit insurance protection system for commercial banks is 
organized in India, while stressing on major differences between India and Germany’s insurance deposit system (see 




The 2011 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey reveal that, both India and Germany have a deposit insurance 
protection system for commercial banks, but they function quite differently. In fact, In India, there is a legally separate 
deposit insurance agency that protects the commercial banks and a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India plays also 
that role (both are public institutions), while in Germany deposit insurance system is managed by the private sector3. 
In both countries, these deposit insurance institutions have access to information’s collected by banking 
supervisors, have the power to cancel or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank, but are not allowed use 
deposit insurance fund for purposes other than depositor protection (e.g. liquidity provision to banks). In addition, these 
institutions don’t cover interbank deposits, deposits of the foreign branches of domestic banks, deposits of the foreign 
subsidiaries of domestic banks. 
However, there are many differences in the system functioning across the two countries. Concerning the 
membership coverage field, in Germany, every bank in the territory is obliged to participate in the insurance deposit 
system, while in India, that participation is optional for foreign banks subsidiaries. Moreover, India’s system managed 
insurance funds per depositors while Germany did the same per account. The percentage of the total deposits of 
participating commercial banks covered by the scheme decreased of 21.12% between 2008 and 2010 in India, moving 
from 56.17% to 36.67% in 2009, to reach later on 35.05% in 2010. The high level of coverage observed in 2008, could be 
explained by safety net put in place during the global financial crisis. 
5.3.2 Positive points in the organization of India’s deposit insurance system compared to that of Germany 
                                                            
2 http://www.investorwords.com/7121/Deposit_Insurance_Fund.html 
3 In Germany, for commercial banks two statutory protection systems exist: the “Entschädigungseinrichtung deutscher Banken (EdB)” for 
private commercial banks and the “Entschädigungseinrichtung Öffentlicher Banken (VÖB)” for the public commercial banks. For private 
commercial banks a voluntary deposit protection fund is set up at the Association of German Banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken) 
while for public commercial banks the corresponding voluntary deposit protection fund is set up at the Federal Association of Public 
Banks (Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschland). 
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The positive points in the organization of India’s deposit insurance system compared to that of Germany are that: At the 
end of 2010, In India, ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets was 0.85%, 0.35% more than that of Germany, 
showing a relatively good capacity of the country to cover participatory banks. Besides, in case of insufficient funds of the 
deposit insurance institutions to refund depositors, deposit insurance institutions of India have the possibility to borrow 
from reserve bank of India, while in Germany it is not the case; they can only borrow to banks on the shortfall. It means 
that, in case of systemic crisis, German Insurance deposits institutions may have difficulties to pay back depositors in the 
short run because the banking system is in crisis, while in India, that situation is less likely to happen, since deposit 
insurance companies can borrow directly from the Reserve Bank. 
 
5.3.3 Negative points in the organization of India’s deposit insurance system compared to that of Germany 
 
The main negative point of India’s deposit insurance system is that, the number of days where the deposit insurance 
scheme is legally obligated to fully reimburse insured depositors is 150 days, 7.5 times longer than that of Germany. In 
time of crisis in India, banks can easily collapse due to the relatively long delay between the crisis and the compensation 
by the deposit insurance system. Another striking negative point of India’s Insurance deposit system is that, unlike 
Germany, it covers deposits denominated in foreign currency; this is quite bad because it can encourage banks and 




Based on our analysis above, we can conclude that the financial sector in India has made significant improvements in 
efficiency, both for financial institutions and markets. The Indian banking system is still dominated by public banks, but is 
judged to be quite competitive with the presence of public, private and foreign banks (BIS, 2001). While the net interest 
margin of Indian banks still doubles that of German banks, it is on a decreasing trend, the cost of financial intermediation 
through banks is thus still high but reducing. The profitability of Indian banks is much higher than their German 
counterparts with an average return on assets and return on equity respectively seven and five times higher during 1997-
2010 and more stable. Cost effectiveness measures have been improving as well. Stock market efficiency in India is also 
high, with trading activity and liquidity at elevated levels. 
The Indian financial system has been stable during the past decades and has not faced any major banking crises. 
Credit risk ratios have been ameliorating: non-performing loans reduced by half between 2005- 2010 (from 5.2% to 2.4%) 
and the bank Z-score of Indian banks increased during 1997-2010, indicating a lower probability of insolvency. Liquidity 
ratios on the other hand have deteriorated with the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding decreasing 
during 1996-2010 and being much below Germany’s ratio. Capital ratios increased and are well above the minimum 
required capital ratio of 9% (at end-2010 at 14% with Tier I at 10% (IMF, 2011)). 
India has a long history of regulation and supervision and commits itself to align with international best practices 
(BIS, 2001). The Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank, supervises the banking sector and implemented Basel II in 
March 2009. Deposit insurance was introduced as early as 1962. 
Overall, we can conclude that risks to the financial stability in India seem low during our period of analysis and 
regulation and supervision are strong. However in recent years, 2011-2012, asset quality has been deteriorating 
considerably (non-performing loans and restructured loans rose to respectively 3,2% and 5.4% of total loans at end-2012) 
and liquidity risk increased (IMF, 2013). The recent financial system stability assessment of IMF concluded “Despite 
these recent successes, India's financial sector still confronts longstanding impediments to its ability to support growth as 
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Table 2: Comparison between India’ and Germany Insurance deposit system 
 
Indicators Germany India 
Management of insurance funds Private sector alone Public sector alone
Role deposit insurance agency Bank examination authority, authority to access 
information collected by banking supervisors, 
power to cancel or revoke deposit insurance for 
any participating bank 
authority to access information collected 
by banking supervisors, power to cancel or 
revoke deposit insurance for any 
participating bank 
participation in the deposit insurance 
system is compulsory 
For every banks in the country (Domestic banks, 
Foreign bank subsidiaries, Foreign bank 
branches) 
Not compulsory for Foreign bank 
subsidiaries 
The deposit insurance coverage type 
is  
Per depositor account Per depositor




Ex ante fund/reserve to cover deposit 
insurance claims in the event of the 
failure of a member bank is provided 
by 
The government alone Government and banks 
Ratio of accumulated funds to total 
bank assets as of end of 2010 
0.5% 0.85%
Events that triggers a claim for 
payment by the deposit insurance 
system 
Banking supervisor decision (not court-declared 
bank bankruptcy, Deposit insurance agency/fund 
administrator decision) 
Banking supervisor decision (not court-
declared bank bankruptcy, Deposit 
insurance agency/fund administrator 
decision) 
days is the deposit insurance scheme 
is legally obligated to fully reimburse 
insured depositors 
20 150
when the deposit insurance fund is 
insufficiently large to be able to fully 
refund depositors 
Its call on banks for the shortfall to borrow money Borrow from reserve bank of India 
Deposits excluded from deposit 
insurance coverage 
Foreign currency deposits, Interbank deposits, 
Deposits of the foreign branches of domestic 
banks, deposits of the foreign subsidiaries of 
domestic banks 
Interbank deposits, Deposits of the foreign 
branches of domestic banks, deposits of 
the foreign subsidiaries of domestic banks 
 
Source: World Bank Global Data Base of the 2011 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
